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In this paper I wish to describe the development of mine compounds on the
Witwatersrand after the South African War and to highlight the central role
they came to play in the process of labour extraction. The compound provides
a useful focus of the labour system on the Witwatersrand over this period
by linking state sponsored mechanisms of labour control (the pass laws,
masters and servants act and labour recruiting) with the internal processes
of the individual mines (control, discipline and coercion).
INTRODUCTION
The years following the South African war saw a decided qualitative change
in the Witwatersrand's many mine compounds. Symptomatic of the period of
more efficient exploitation fostered under the Milner adminstration, and
particularly as a result of the strict controls introduced for Chinese
labour from 1904 onwards, the compounds came to resemble more closely the
effective institutions of worker control that were to dominate the South
African migrant labour system throughout the century.(1)
In the years immediately following the South African war there were dramatic
changes in Che labour market of Southern Africa. A number of factors,
including the growth of alternative, more attractive, work opportunities,(2)
induced greater competition for labour within the South African market.
Urgent representations were made by mine management for the state to remedy
the "labour shortage". The 1903 Transvaal Labour Commission of Inquiry and
the subsequent importation of Chinese indentured labour in 1904 were instit-
uted in response. In addition the industry initiated measures to reduce
internal competition. The Kitwatersrand Native Labour Association was
established to undertake combined labour recruiting and a maximum average
wage schedule was agreed upon within the industry to prevent further com-
petition. Because of the stringent profitability constraints within which
the mining industry operated and the continued exploitation of low yield
mines, labour could not be attracted through increased, more competitive
wages. Management devised a range of mechanisms to recruit and retain labour.
WNLA and later other recruiting agents waged a concerted campaign to obtain
labour from within Southern Africa using a variety of methods.(3)
Due to the nature of the labour market and the often deceptive or coercive
manner in which workers were obtained, management, in close collaboration
with the state, devised a range of mechanisms to ensure the completion of
contracts and prevent desertion. The pass-laws were a crucial component of
management's strategy.(4) In conjunction, the'Master and Servants Law, pro-
hibited strike action by black workers and thus ensured their continued cheap-
ness. Within the mines widespread violence and coercion was employed to
ensure the continued subjugation and productivity of workers. The compound
was the social pivot of this system of labour repression.
Prior to the South African War mine compounds developed along rudimentary
lines compared with the tight security of those in Kimberley. However, as
a result of the changes in the labour market after the war, management paid
closer attention to compound security and efficiency. The relative freedom
of movement previously enjoyed by workers was drastically reduced as the
compounds became virtually "closed".(5) Desertion became increasingly
difficult and absenteeism was reduced. In 1903 the Department of Native
Affairs reported that "loafing" was "practically stamped out". In June
1903, 5,4 workers per thousand "loafed" as opposed to a rate of 33,7 for
the corresponding month in 1899,(6)
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
Compounds at the turn of the century generally consisted of a rectangular
gathering of huts or barracks in which workers lived. The courtyard in the
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centre would contain the kitchen, washing facilities (if they existed) and
possibly the compound manager's office. Extensions of corrugated iron and
vood were often built onto the original brick structures, making the court-
yard more cramped. Conditions varied from one mine to another. However
some were bad enough to necessitate official action in terras of the rudi-
mentary niinimum standards laid down in 1905 by the Coloured Labourers Health
Regulation Ordinance. Official action was hardly vigourous and often con-
sisted of informal requests for improvement which allowed for lengthy
stalling action on the part of the mines concerned.
Compound rooms or huts accommodated anything between 20 and 50 workers.
Usually double decked bunks were built against the wall', and were often
turned into separate cabins by their occupants nailing strips of wood over
the openings to protect themselves and their belongings. As a result of
overcrowding in most casesfworkers were forced to sleep on earth floors
which, because of poor drainage and leaking roofs, became-muddy during
rain. Heating facilities were seldom provided and workers installed their
own ' Imbnnla or fire buckets which usually had no chimneys. Damp conditions
combined with poor ventilation and the fumes of the fire buckets contributed
towards r.he high incidence of respiratory disease rates on the mines.
Workers would also experience drastic changes in temperature as they emerged
from an underground shift and often had no opportunity to dry their clothes.
Usually they would have to stand in the heat, wet or cold waiting for their
work and meal tickets.
In 1903, 5022 African' workers were officially reported to have died on the
Witwatcrsrand mines and the causes were summarised as follows:(8)
Pneumonia and
Tuberculosis
Accidents
meningitis 59
5
4
,90%
33%
;c3%
Intestinal
Scurvy
Other
infections 11
5
12
,86%
,87Z
,90Z
At the turn of the century few compounds had washing facilities but by 1903
most had installed concrete baths in the courtyard in which workers washed
themselves and their clothes.(9)
The remarkable variation in conditions from one mine to another appears
to have been determined by a mixture of their different profitability rates
and arbitrary managerial attitudes. The variations were reflected in'
death rates which in 1903 ranged from 31,10 per thousand per annum on the
Wemmer mine to 135,21 per thousand on the Witwatersrand Deep Mine. By
1905 the death rate for the Langlaagte nine was still as high as 135,68 per
thousand.(10) An inspection in 1908 revealed that despite government
requests for improvements, conditions on the Randfontein group of mines (11)
were as bad as, or worse than, after the war.
Diet also contributed towards the high rate of disease and death. The
industry's drive to keep"working costs" as low as possible, determined
that the workers' diet was both monotonous and deficient. Scurvy rates
grew to alarming proportions after the war. Vegetables were rare as part
of a compound diet and the mealie-meal, the staple content, was inferior,
being derived from oven dried imported grain and had minimal nutrition.(12)
Medical officers as well as the Department of Native Affairs made recommen-
dations for improvements to the diet and accommodation with varying tones
of urgency. The government was loath to introduce and enforce regulations.
In addition, those medical officers most aware of the prevailing conditions
were usually employed by the mines and therefore found it difficult to
press too strongly or openly for improvements, if they were in any way
inclined to do so.(13) The most that medical officers achieved were piece-
meal improvements and the widespread introduction of "kaffir-beer" as a
3/:
- 3 -
nutritious diet supplement from 1903 onwards. Workers did whatever they
could themselves to supplement their diet.(14) A black contractor estimated *"
in 1907 that mine workers spent over twenty of the fifcy shillings they
then earned per month on food purchases.(15) It was clearly to management's -.
benefit for workers to spend a considerable portion of their wages on food. L
T J Britten, who conducted a study of "Native WasLage" for the Chamber of •
Mines in 1904 recommended that the mines should provide .
Greater facilities to the natives to spend their money by thei
establishment of a greater number of eating houses and kaffir stores,
conducted under the supervision of the mines.
He said all managers agreed with him that if this was done workers would
spend longer times on the Witwatersrand on the presumption that they had
earning targets which would take longer to reach.(16)
Food, as an extremely scarce commodity in the compounds, became an instru-
ment of coercion in the hands of management. Food stappages were used in
some mines to punish "loafers" and "inefficients" who did not go on shift
or complete their quota of work. Mines in the Consolidated Cold Fields
and J B Robinson groups were noted by Pritchard of the Native Affairs
Department in 1909 as being most inclined to use this method. In the case
of the J B Robinson mines ' ' •
At one time the food ration was refused to 'loafers', as they
termed them, with the result that, in some cases I am informed
'inefficients' /who possibly may not have been physically able
to perform the standard day's work7 and actually sick natives
have been in the past deprived of food. It is well known that the
natives share their food and it should therefore have been obvious
to those in authority that punishment of this nature would fall as
heavily on good workers as it would on.malingerers and loafers who it
was specially desired should suffer by it.(17)
On the Celdenhuis Deep Mine workers were given a bonus of "one pound of raw
meat" if they drilled an extra 48 inches in one shift. The Manager
reported that "the experiment has been found to act as a splendid induce-
ment to Natives to become more efficient, while the native efficiency of
this mine has increased during the last feu weeks by leaps and bounds."(18)
The physical conditions outlined above constituted the debilitating compound
environment in which workers' goals were maintained at a conveniently low
level, concerned primarily with day to day survival and the eventual com-
pletion of their contracts. The alternative chosen by many was to desert.
Those who remained found relief in liquor, which was traded illegally in
great quantities and varieties. On those Sundays when shifts did not go
down (19) workers would buy meat to cook over outside fires and drink what-
ever concoctions they could obtain or brew themselves. Sunday revelry
sometimes developed into inter-tribal or even inter-compound clashes.
Workers also found human contact and sexual release in nearby locations
if these were allowed to develop and access was permitted.
STRUCTURES OF CONTROL
The central authority in the compound was the white manager. Workers
understood that he exercised extreme power over their daily working lives.
Higher management relied on him to maintain discipline and a continuous
pressure on workers to work their shifts. The compound manager, through
the tremendous power he exercised, often determined the level of coercion
and violence that would prevail throughout the mine. He could choose to
provide relatively good accommodation and food as well as protection against
violence inflicted by white workers. If he left labour control in the
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^hands of cruel compound policemen, neglected
compound conditions and condoned or encouraged violence, his mine would
1
 earn a bad reputation. Some compound managers in fact intervened effectively
•p= on behalf of workers who had been cheated of their pay. (20) Mr H M Taberer,
at the time an inspector for the Department of Native Affairs, admitted in
1907 that the compound manager, with his force of "police" was the de facto
ruler over the workers' lives, having complete control over their freedom
of movement through the pass system.(21) Only compound managers could issue
special passes for workers to leave the compound if they were not going
on shift.
The manager had under his command a group of compound "police" who played
a crucial collaborative role in controlling workers. '.3 van Onselen found
in Rhodesia, compound "police" on the Witwatersrand, were also selected
because of their social distance from the majority of Africans amongst whom
they would work.(22) On the Witwatersrand, workers from Natal and Zulu-
land remained a small proportion of the labour force during the period
under review.(23) Evidence indicates that Zulus were appointed as compound
"police" on many mines. Numerous complaints against their excesses were
recorded. Tribal headmen and sons of chiefs of various tribes were also
appointed as police on some mines.(24) Some mine managements recognised
that the level of antagonism between vorkers and "police" of different
tribes was non-productive and appointed "police" representative of all the
tribes in the compound.(25)
However, management also used tribal differences as a means of maintaining
division amongst workers. Buckle, Chairman of the 1931 Native Grievances
Enquiry listed the following as the three "safeguards" used by management:
"(1) The personal influence of the compound managers.
(2) The native respect for European authority as personified
in the police.
(3) The inter-tribal jealousies which have always rendered it
possible, in the last resort, to protect Europeans by
utilising one tribe against another."(26)
Evidence shows that inter-tribal jealousies were maintained through the
compound "police", separate accommodation (usually according to the prefer-
ence of workers themselves), tribally composed work gangs and through
differential access to scarce commodities like food.
Heading the compound "police", and directly under the compound manager was
the head Induna. He supervised the compound police and fed the manager y'
"with a constant stream of politico-economic intelligence".(27) The
"police" wore uniforms and handcuffs and carried sjamboks which they used
liberally as they "hustled" workers from the compounds to the tnineheads to
go on shift. When complaints arose regarding the use of sjamboks, manage"
ment argued that they were merely meant to be "badges of office" and dis-
claimed responsibility for their other uses.(28) "Bossboys", another key
group of collaborators, controlled workers underground and extended the
violence of the compound system. They also used sjamboks to maintain
discipline (29) in conjunction with the white miners who also dispersed
blows freely.
Workers reacted against the compound and underground collaborators in the
limited ways that they were able to. The mining industry of which the colla-
borators were the agents, "the abrasive edge of managerial practice and
policy",(30) suffered as a consequence of the high rate of defensive
desertion and labour withdrawal that occurred.(31) Sir Godfrey Lagden,Commissioner of
Native Affairs, while on tour of the Cape Colony in 1904 with the S.A.
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Native Affairs Commission, wrote a memorandum to his office drawing attention
to the fact that potential workers in the Cape refused to be recruited for
the Witwatersrand "because they are set upon and hammered by the Zulu
police on the mines".(32) I have been unable to find direct evidence of
individual retaliatory action by workers against compound police but I
am convinced that it occurred(33) Such action would have produced minimal
results compared with labour withdrawal. Management was more concerned to
prevent labour withdrawal than to protect its own collaborators.
Each mine compound had, as a vital part of its coercive machinery, a
detention room, or, as it was known to workers, "stocks" a result of the
fact that stocks were used in these rooms until the time of the Kilner
Administration. (34) In 1903 the acting pass commissioner judged the mine
detention room to be:
an absolute essential as being the only means of controlling
riotous and quarrelsome natives. It must be remembered that in the
majority of cases mines are situated in a very considerable
distance from any charge office or gaol, and as it not infrequently
happens that a native 'runo amok1 it is necessary that he should
be promptly dealt with in order to prevent further developments".(35)
The Commissioner claimed that department inspectors were always informed
whenever a worker was detained so that such workers were "seldom detained
for more than a few hours". However it is clear that the use of detention
rooms was hardly controlled as judiciously as the Commissioner tried to
make out. Compound police could detain workers as they saw fit and numerous
cases emerged where white miners and contractors also made use of the
detention room to punish workers under their supervision underground.(36)
In 1905 a white contractor, Anderson, on the Croesus mine was found guilty
of assaulting
one native Jim Simali by placing handcuffs on his wrists and
handcuffing him to an iron staple attached to a wooden plank
made fast to the floor and did keep the said Jim Simali in this
position for A days without food or drink.
In defence Anderson claimed that
This is a common practice on the mines to lock up natives like
this - a kind of punishment. We are not allowed to lash them so
they are locked up.
Simali had refused to return to work for Anderson on the night shift, as
he had already worked an entire day shift. Anderson was fined £20 or one
month's imprisonment.(37) Far from controlling the use of the detention
rooms, some compound managers abused the institution. In 1909 the Assistant
Compound Manager at the Village Deep was found guilty of assaulting a worker
and "inflicting various wounds" by thrashing him with a sjambok while he was
fastened by handcuffs' to a table in a detention room for about 12 hours. (38)
In June 1902 1 000 workers at the Langlaagte mine went on strike, broke
out of their compound and marched towards the Village Deep Mine from where
they had been recruited. The strike was defused by police action. However
one policeman reported the complaints made to him by the workers:
The compound manger ill treats them by having them thrashed in
the compound and down the mine with a cat-o-nine tails and
thrashed them on. the testicles: further that they were not
allowed out of the compound for a moment, that they were shut up
like dogs. Also that the compound manager gave instructions to the
i
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native police to hit them when they saw fit, stated that they
would work and not give any trouble if the compound manager
treated them as human beings not dogs nnd they would not continue
to work while he was in charge of the compound and they would
kill him if he continued (39)
It is important not to generalise with regard to such patterns of violence.
The fact that the Langlaagte strike was partially a result of the disparity
of conditions experienced by the workers who had previously worked at
Village Deep, indicates that workers themselves recognised the differences.
In 1905. the District Controller at Boksburg noted the considerable variations
in conditions:
On certain mines, no harsh treatment of any nature whatever will" be
permitted. On others, I regret to have to state, it is not only
passively winked at, but in some cases actively condoned... (40)
The compound structure provided a cover for violence at all levels of the
labour extraction process. In the first instance, a worker, if he wished
to lay u complaint of assault, and presuming he had a day off shift, would
have to obtain a special day pass from the compound manager to proceed to
the nearest pass office. The manager could refuse such a pass if he realised
the worker's intention, which he would in most cases. Native Affairs
inspectors or police investigators would always have to obtain the manager's
permission to enter the compound and would probably have to state their
purpose. They could easily be misdirected by the manager as Pritchard,
the Boksburg Native Affairs District Controller had experienced:
... the Department will always be at the mercy of the Manager and
Compound Overseer, as far as our intelligence is concerned... the
crux of the reason why our intelligence is defective, is the fact
that Compound Overseers do not - and I go further and say dare
not, report to the Officers of the Department every occurrence
having reference to the conditions of the natives under them...
the mere giving away of 'compound secrets' might mean summary
dismissal (
In the closed society of the compound, witnesses could be prevailed upon to
make themselves unavailable. Pritchard exemplified this in 1905:
On the new Modderfontein Cold Mining Company a very serious case
of assault was unearthed in which a native who had been kicked
in the ribs, died of the effects. The case was handed over to
the Transvaal Town Police, but, notwithstanding their most strenuous
endeavours, no prosecution was instituted, owing to the fact that
the principal witnesses were - in my opinion - spirited away. (42)
Whatever the decision of a court might be, the complainant would still
have to return to his compound and perhaps suffer reprisals, possibly of
a more covert nature. A worker had very little to gain by laying a com-
plaint:
... I am of opinion that all cases of ill treatment do not come
to the knowledge of our office in the form they should. Witness
the case of Rex vs Seames. In this the natives admitted on oath,
that they had never complained, or thought of complaining, of what
was subsequently.found to be wholesale flogging of a most brutal
anture.(43)
The compound extended the clandestine nature of the widespread pattern of
underground assault. In the same way it protected management from workers
taking legal action against other forms of abuse, particularly illegal pay
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deductions and extensions of contract time. Compound society was regulated
 r
by its own rules and survival necessitated compliance and subjugation.
Even where workers did lay a complaint of ill-usage and Native Affairs and "v
police investigations led to a prosecution, the law courts, reflecting j^.
standards of settler justice, did not strain their powers to punish assault.
Punishment for white miners convicted of assault was always minimal. For
example, a Native Affairs Official noted in 1906 that in a particular
assault case in which the accused was merely discharged with a warning, the
magistrate made remarks in court which made it "appear that he considers
flogging of natives by their employers as justifiable under certain
circumstances". The District Controller continued: • .
This may in some way account for the number of assault cases in
which I have recently failed to obtain convictions against
white men for assaults of natives".(44)
Although individual government officials(45) attempted to act against
abuses and even agitate for reforms, policy makers in the Milner administration
would consistently refrain from interfering with the mine's internal labour
extraction processes and continued until its demise, to tread its colla-
borative path.(46) This attitude was reflected in the action of what one
speculates to be the majority of department inspectors. An African contractor
told the 1907 Mining Industry Commission:
The complaints of natives are many, but are not known, and
even if they are known they are winked at by the so-called
Insepctors who spend much of their time in chatting with the
mine officials and neglect the people whom they are supposed
to look after. (47)
The manner in which the State supported the. compound system is reflected
in the following two cases. On 1909, as a result of an increasing incidence
of assaults being exposed, the CID Deputy Commissioner wrote to his
superiors as follows:
I desire to draw the commissioner's attention to the so called
mine police boys employed by'the different mine companies.
These boys are not in any way legally sanctioned either to
arrest or otherwise detain natives ... still they are to be
seen going about armed with handcuffs and a badge and making
arrests. In the mine compounds there are cells in which the
natives are imprisoned and in which they are frequently handcuffed
under cruel and unneccessary conditions, and no steps appear to be
taken by the Inspector of Mines Department or Native Affairs Depart-
ment to remedy matters. (48)
The commissioner of police proposed that the compound "police" should be
drawn under the control of his department, a proposal which the Native
Affairs Department opposed strenuously and successfully. The latter was
very loath to interfere with the "individuality and influence" of the com-
pound manager "so essential to a well controlled native compound".(49)
In 1905 Brownlee, Magistrate at Mount Fletcher in the Cape, was sent to
Johannesburg as a result of complaints sent by workers to their district
magistrates. He took statements from the workers on the New Heriot and
Driefontein mines which revealed particularly indiscriminate punishment
being meted out by white miners and very little attempt being made by
compound overseers to rectify the situation. The reasons for assault ranged
from lack'of skill on the workers part to plain unprovoked violence.
White miners punched, kicked and struck with instruments such as sjamboks,
jumpers, stones, hammers, shovels and leather bands. Workers' heads and
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groins appear to have been prime targets, although some miners had sufficient
foresight to hit them only where they were clothed, so that marks would
not give evidence of thoir action.(50)
Officials of the Transvaal Native Affairs Department became highly indig-
nant at the fact that Brownlee, from another colony, had come to investigate
and expose conditions on "their" mines. In their objections they inadver-
tently gave an indication of their attitudes to assaults on workers:
without in any way desiring to justify the assailant
I cannot but think that the natives gave considerable provocation
by their insolent and insubordinate manner. It should not be
overlooked that miners are, as a rule a rough and ready
class who give a blow as a means of correction as naturally as
a duck.takes to water though nothing could excuse anything
in the nature of a deliberate flogging.(SI)
CONCLUSION
Beyond providing for coercive labour extraction and tho continued subjug-
ation of workers, compounds during the period under review became effective
instruments to quell worker unrest and resistance and to prevent inter-
mine organisation. This purpose was most clearly articulated by Buckle,
chairman of the 1913 Native Grievances Enquiry. He recommended
that steps ought certainly, to be taken to render compounds
more easily convertible into places of detention, where the
compound has strong, steel cased gates which can be locked
from the outside, and one entrance, and high walls with
no outer windows, a comparatively few armed men can prevent
exit from it and thus isolate a disturbance which might other-
wise spread with alarming consequences. (52)
Police and management tactics during strikes that have been documented,
indicate that consistently, the first step was to persuade or force
workers back to their compound. Promises of reform would be made and
assurances given by state officials. However, once back in the compound,
workers would be less militant, and promises were never fulfilled.
I hope that I have been able to reflect the development of the compounds on
the Witwatersrand in a way which not only describes their environment but
which also indicates their vital role in labour extraction. Indeed the
former is merely a symptom of the latter. During the century compounds were
to become more uniform and sophisticated in their methods and structures.
However, their violent and coercive roots were to have a determining
influence on patterns of industrial relations.
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NOTES
1. Compounds in the gold raining industry have been discussed by other
writers including Van Onselen, C. Chibaro; "The Role of Collaborators
in the Rhodesian Mining Industry 1900-1935" African Affairs Vol. 27,
October 1973; Pearson, P. "Authority and Control in a South African
Goldmine Compound" African Studies Institute, Wits. Mimeo. This
apper confirms the observations made by these writers. However an
attempt is made to place the development of the compounds within a
particular historical context - a period during which pressure for
production increased and the compound became consciously included as
a managerial mechanism to extract most production for least expense.
2. See Moroney Industrial Conflict in a Labour Repressive Economy:
Black Labour on the Transvaal Gold Mines 1901-1912 Honours Dissertation
Wits 1976 pp. 1-2.
3. Ibid., pp.19-31.
4. See Johnatone, Class Race and Gold pp. 35-39.
5. The fact that the compounds were not completely closed was due largely,
van Onselen claims, to opposition from trade and commerce, which
sector thrived on the custom of mine workers who bought food on a
large scale to supplement their diets. Correspondence to the Depart-
ment of Native Affairs from representatives of trade and commerce,
confirms this claim. See SNA 2/251/01. Letter from the Association
of Chambers of Commerce of S.A.; also SNA 2/300/01.
6. Secretary for Native Affairs 23/1761/03. Report of the Chief Inspector,
"loafing" was a term applied by management to a labour pattern symp-
tomatic of the Witwatersrand's work environment. Long shifts, bad
health, mistreatment, the effects of liquor and poor motivation caused
a considerable number of a mine's work complement to absent themselves
from the daily shift. "Loafing" or absenteeism can be viewed as a
short term worker strategy in protest against conditions or merely
to ensure recuperation and ultimate survival.
7. Fergwsson, Central, Robinson, North Randfontein, South Randfontein,
Porges and Stubbs.
8. These figures do not reflect the numerous workers who died on the way
to or at home of diseases or injuries contracted or received while
on Witwatersrand mines. There is evidence that this incalculable
death rate i>as substantial. Figures taken from Coelho Report
SNA'40/12/03 p.19.
9. SNA 9/1200/02. Report by inspector Pietersen on compounds, 23 July
1902; See Coelho Report, SNA 50/2912/03 and Report on the compounds
for further details of compount conditions of the Randfontein group
of nines, SNA 76/1616/Oii, October 1908.
10. SNA 4O/2255/P2. Comparative Death Rates on Various Mines, 1903;
SNA 56/1303/05. Report by Dr Turner.
11. Fergusson, Central, Robinson,. North Randfontein, South Randfontein,
Porges and Stubbs.
12.- In 19.03 Dr Sansom, the District Health Officer, instigated en enquiry
into the quality of meal used on the mines. Samples of the meal
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were examined by a government analyst and many were found to be unfit
for human consumption containing moulds, weevils and other insects.
SNA 28/2788/03. Sansom to Windhara.
13. In March 1902, Wybergh, the Government Mining Engineer, wrote to
Dr Turner, a government doctor, about the high rate of preventable
illness in the mines and commented on the compromising situation of
mine medical officers: "... so long as they are paid by the mining
companies they dare not press their opinions where expensive alter-
ations or improvements are required. They are simply at the mercy
of their employers, and would in very many cases undoubtedly be dis-
cussed if they made themselves unpleasant. Of courso there are
honourable exceptions... but you must be aware of cases in which
medical reports have been suppressed or amended even when made by
very responsible men." SNA 7/609/02, 21 March 1902.
14. The Chamber of Mines supported the introduction of "kaffirbeer"
because "the privilege thus granted would render the natives more con-
tented and inclined to prolong their stay on the Rand". SNA 14/1858/02.
15. Makhothe in evidence before the 1907 Mining Industry Commission.
Minutes of evidence p.1449. Such food purchases would often benefit
the mining companies themselves as they owned mine stores.
16. Herman Ekstein Archives 138:395 T Britten, Report on the wastage of
Native Labour on the mines of the Witwatersrand District 1904.
17. SNA 90/1825/09. Memorandum by Pritchard on the position of
the Native labour supply as at 31 March 1909 p.21.
18. Ibid. Pritchard quoting Hallimond p.22.
19. When shifts did not go down on Sundays workers were not paid for the
day, nor were they provided with mine rations as a general rule.
20. SNA 61/3868/05. Smith, District Controller Krugersdorp to Windham,
Secretary for Native Affairs.
21. Mining Industry Commission, 1907 Mininutes of evidence p.1315. The
central position of the compound manager from worker's view is reflected
in the names given to mines. A large proportion were named after
. compound managers, their attributes or characteristics:
eg. Henry Nourse Deep - Madonnel (McDonald)
Van Ryn West - Thomas
Robinson Deep - David
Primrose in Sinqangau - Fierce T taper
Bonanza - Spensile - Spencer
SNA 8/858/02. "Revised list of Kaffir Names on'Mines", 14 October 1907.
22. Van Onselen, C. "The Role of Collaborators in the Rhodesian Mining
Industry 1900-1935" African Affairs vol. 27, 1973 p.403.
23. In 1903 for example, Zulu tribesmen constituted only 1,022 of the'
total African work force on the mines. SNA 27/771/03 Report of WNLA
Board of management 2 April 1903. Zulus also appear to have mono-
polised positions in the State's black police force.
24. Chiefs played a corresponding collaborative role in the recruiting
process. The cooption of tribal authority in the labour extraction
system is an important theme. For further details regarding chiefs
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as collaborators see Moroney, S. Op Cit p.28. - •
25. Native Grievances Enquiry Report 1913-14 UC 34 p.19.
26. Ibid, p.64. ' »
27. Ibid, p.16
28. Ibid, p.19.
29. tbid. p.19.
30. Van Onselen, C. Chibaro p.141.
31. For a more detailed description of these strategies of worker protest
see Moroney, S. "Mine Worker Protest on the Wit'watersrand 1901-1912"
South African Labour Bulletin vol. 3 No. 5, March-April 1977. pp.11-15.
32. SNA 39/2936/04. Lagden to Windham. This strong reaction was confirmed
by reports submitted by 18 Cape Chiefs who were taken on a tour of
the Reef's compounds in 1903, in an attempt to promote recruiting in
their home areas. Almost without exception they cited the rough
treatment by compound police, usually named as being Zulu, as one of
the Chief complaints of the workers they had interviewed and a retard-
ing factor in recruiting.
33. Van Onselen's study of the Ninevite organisation shows that collaborators
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